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The Italian Mind: Vernacular Logic in Renaissance Italy (1540 –1551). Marco
Sgarbi.
Medieval and Renaissance Authors and Texts 12. Leiden: Brill, 2014. ix þ 246 pp.
$142.
Expanding the ﬁeld of early modern logic texts in English, French, and Spanish,
the present volume introduces the authors and their works of logic in Italian.
Against the background of Quattrocento humanism, the study focuses on the major
ﬁgures of the Accademia degli Inﬁammati (Academy of the Burning Ones). The
meaning of its name may be gathered from its motto: “Burning the mortal, to the
heavens the immortal shall go” (228). Although the academy lasted in Padua for only
two years (June 1540–May 1542), Sgarbi claims that the thinkers it attracted, the
texts it produced, and the academies it spawned transformed logic from the humanistrhetorical model of the ﬁfteenth century to an epistemic model characteristic of early
modern science.
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Chapter 1 gives the historical background of sixteenth-century logic. Sgarbi recites
the tired cliches about Scholasticism now commonplace in Renaissance studies.
Scholastic “subtleties,” “meaningless sophistries,” and “logical formalism” had severed
the relation of res (objects) from verba (words). Inspired by Valla’s Dialectical
Disputations, Quattrocento humanists restored the relation of res to verba, dialectic to
rhetoric, wisdom to eloquence. Valla, however, ignored the logic of his own day: his
diatribes were aimed not at the living logica modernorum, but rather at the dead logica
vetus of Boethius. In a similar way Sgarbi disregards contributions of Scholastic logic that
are relevant to his study.
Chapter 2 further examines the split between res and verba and argues that the
humanist program for joining them itself precipitated a crisis. Insisting on grammatical
and rhetorical purity, most humanists privileged Greek and Latin as the only languages
of competent thought and openly expressed their disdain for the vernacular (volgare).
Debate among humanists on the merits of the volgare (see Mazzocco, 1993) led to
a movement on its behalf, namely, vernacular humanism. Inﬂuenced by the humane and
practical philosophy of Pietro Pomponazzi, the academy arose “with a view to
combatting the degeneracy and rhetorical purism of the humanists who were still tied
to classical Latin on the one hand, and linguistic anarchy on the other” (42). One
consequence of this development was a renewed rupture between knowledge about
things (res) and expressions of that knowledge (verba). Just how a fatal ﬂaw in
Scholasticism could become a redeeming virtue in vernacularism is not explained.
Chapters 3, 4, and 7 are devoted, respectively, to Sperone Speroni and his students
Bernardino Tomitano, Benedettto Varchi, and Allesandro Piccolomini — all of whom
were leading members of the academy. Chapters 5 and 6 treat Antonio Tridapale and
Nicolo Massa, nonmembers who were inﬂuenced by the academy. Chapter 8 sums up
the academy’s contributions. It opposed the “hyperphilologism” of the humanists and
vigorously promoted the vernacular not only as a medium for expressing logic, but also
for reasoning and speaking correctly. It treated the vernacular as a “language of culture.”
It stressed the role of logic as an instrument (organon) for scientiﬁc discovery. Finally, it
recognized that a learned vernacular could empower the maximal number of persons.
After the academy’s demise, vernacular logics declined in quality.
Sgarbi stresses the importance of printing for the development of vernacular
intellectualism; yet almost all of the works that he describes remain in manuscript. If
vernacular logic was as signiﬁcant as Sgarbi represents it to have been, why were these
works not published? Like Valla, Sgarbi ignores late Scholastic logic, yet Scholastic topics
appear in the texts that he discusses, for example the oppositional square, syllogism, and
consequences. His study could have been strengthened — and the texts properly
evaluated — by comparing them to Scholastic works such as Paul of Venice’s Logica
Parva. Printed mainly in Venice in more than 10,000 copies, it was the leading logic
handbook in Italy and available in Padua, home of the academy.
Finally, scholars have assumed that Scholastic logic had no connection with
vernacular language. This assumption is questionable. As a second-order discipline,
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logic was never about itself: it was always about the syntactical and semantical properties of
ﬁrst-order languages such as university Latin or the many vernaculars that students spoke.
As the research of Tony Hunt (1991) and Robert Black (2001) has shown, students in
France and England learned Latin by translating sentences into French and English. A
similar practice was likely followed in Italy. Scholastic tracts on the proof of terms
(probatio terminorum) make no sense from the point of view of formal logic. They make
a great deal of sense, however, as protocols for translating Latin sentences into the
vernaculars. Given limited grammar instruction, the study of logic was the ﬁrst
opportunity university students had to learn the syntax of their own vernaculars. These
matters aside, Marco Sgarbi’s study is the most informative account to date of sixteenthcentury vernacular logic and will remain an important resource for years to come.
ALAN R. PERREIAH, University of Kentucky
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